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“I did not come to in order to be loved but in order to voice the sentiments of the public ,” said Minister Miri Regev.
Meanwhile, an Opposition Member of Knesset exclaimed that “we are here because we reflect and represent the
people.”1)Haim Jelin, Yesh Atid (party), Knesset Session/Sitting (3 August 2016) (our translation; emphasis
added). These statements are emblematic of the rise of populist politics. The populist rhetoric exhibited by Israeli
politicians signals a new development in Israeli politics. I call this development public sentiment mirroring (or
“mirroring” for short). Mirroring requires the state to replicate in its policies the dominant or prevailing public
opinions. It also requires weakening the power of institutions which "distort" the "authentic" voice of the public
such as courts, the media, the academia and other "elitist" institutions.
Populist politics and populist judiciaries cast a shadow over constitutionalism. Coupled with vehement opposition
to the so-called ‘judicial activism’ of the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) and declining public confidence in the
HCJ, populism poses a very real threat to Israel’s constitutional order.
In Israel, the rise of populist politics has seen increasing public opposition to constitutionalism, and in particular to
judicial review by the HCJ. By bolstering the case for mirroring the public and depicting the courts as inferior
reflectors of public opinion (compared to the legislature or executive), populism threatens the authority of the
courts.  Courts have responded to this threat in different ways. Sometimes, courts themselves embrace
populism. At other times, courts resist the populism, employing a range of principles to hold their ground,
including legalism and core social values.
Courts Embracing Populism
Courts, in an attempt to defend their authority in the face of populism, can themselves resort to and take on the
mantle of populism. How does this occur? To begin with, courts recognise the democratic deficit generated by
populism. Then, in order to compensate for this democratic deficit, courts seek to themselves give effect to public
convictions.
In the case of Danilowitz, Justice Dorner held that the same-sex partner of an air steward was entitled to the
same benefits to which a different-sex partner would have been entitled. Dorner exclaimed that
we cannot decide the petition before us without referring to the changes that have taken place with
regard to social norms in Israel respecting homosexuality … The principle of equality does not
operate in a social vacuum. The question whether a certain case involves discrimination between
equals, or whether it merely involves different treatment of different people, is decided on the basis
of the accepted social outlooks.2)HCJ 721/94 El Al Israeli Airlines Ltd. v. Danilovich  48(5) PD 749
[1994] (Isr.) [1], [4] (Dorner J) (YU trans).
Dorner proceeded to examine the changing attitudes to, and norms surrounding, same-sex relationships.
According to Dorner, the social acceptance of same-sex relationships compelled the Court to adopt a liberal
interpretation of the relevant statute, giving legal expression to recently established social norms. Dorner’s
judgment implies that she maintained that she was better equipped (than politicians) to mirror public opinion. The
legitimacy of her judgment, therefore, appealed to populist considerations.
The upshot of Dorner’s judicial populism is ironic. Ordinarily, we might assume that a person’s entitlement to a
legal remedy would be enhanced by their facing social, economic and/or political discrimination. Yet, according to
Dorner, this is not the case. Only those groups who already benefit from community understanding and
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recognition can invoke judicial action and gain legal protection. In fact, the stronger the discrimination which an
individual or group faces (such that the hardship of the victim is not understood or recognized), the weaker the
justification for courts to intervene and protect them. Under judicial populism, at least in respect of discriminated
groups and individuals, public opinion is the touchstone for judicial action.
Judicial populism, however, can also emerge in response to other stimuli. Sometimes courts — through their own
volition — seek to anticipate developing public trends.3)David A. Strauss, "The Modernizing Mission of Judicial
Review" (2009) 76 The University of Chicago Law Review 859, 888. At other times, courts wish to minimize
friction between them and the elected branches of government,4)Strauss, pp 861–3. and in doing so become
hyper-sensitive to the political ramifications of their decisions. By deferring to populist sentiment, either by
exercising excessive restraint or by crafting their decisions to mirror public sentiment, courts may, ironically,
experience a loss in public support, fracturing the backbone of the judicial system.
Courts Resisting Populism
Instead of embracing populism, sometimes, courts vehemently oppose populism. Courts can (and, on occasion,
do) resist the integration of public opinion into judicial decision making. I explore two different grounds for this
resistance: (a) legalism, and (b) core values.
Legalism
The legalist approach seeks to distance judges from the political realm. Legal, as opposed to political or other
considerations, are supposed to shape judicial decision-making. Characteristic of this approach is the following
pronouncement of Justice Moshe Landau, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel:
[T]here is still grave concern that the Court would appear to be abandoning its proper place and
descending into the arena of public debate and that its ruling will be applauded by some of the
public and utterly, vehemently rejected by others. In this sense, I see myself here as one whose
duty is to rule in accordance with the law on any matter lawfully brought before the court. It forces
me, knowing full well in advance that the wider public will not notice the legal argumentation but
only the final conclusion and the appropriate status of the court, as an institution, may be harmed,
to rise above the disputes which divide the public. Alas, what are we to do when this is our role
and duty as justices.5)HCJ 390/79 Duwekat v Gov’t of Israel [30] at p. 1 – cited in Arbel’s judgment
YU translation. Review trans. and condense where possible. — (emphasis added)
Landau believes that the courts gain their legitimacy through strict adherence to the law. It is therefore imperative
that the judiciary remain insulated from public debate. If, as populism strives to achieve, imperative mandates of
the public were to bind judicial decision-making, the public, rather than the law, would reign supreme. Judicial
populism would therefore, according to the legalist approach, amount to a breach of the rule of law.
However, the rule of law, when defined narrowly, can mean little as all judges purport to “apply the law”. The rule
of law is also often confused with literalism.6)The rule of law is also confused with minimalism. It is sometimes
argued that to act 'legally' means to give great deference to other branches of government. We believe this is also
erroneous as the question of what the law is, is a contested question and it is a semantic manipulation to
presuppose that minimalism should be equated with legalism. The question of what the law is cannot be settled
by 'a semantic sting'. It ought to be the byproduct of normative considerations. Some judges (and politicians)
believe that the rule of law implies rigid adherence with the language of the law. This, of course, is highly
controversial, but this view often is equated with the rule of law.
Core Values
Legalism, however, is not the only bulwark against populism. The core values approach also sees mirroring as
highly problematic. According to the core values approach, mirroring undermines proper representation of the
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public’s core values in the judicial sphere. Core values differ from mirroring in that it aims to reflect not present
public opinions but the values upon those opinions rest.
The core values approach recognizes that under populism first-order convictions, rather than underlying values,
dictate policy and law-making, even in the judicial sphere. In addition, populism is inherently anti-pluralist; it does
not reflect the full spectrum of the public’s perspectives. Legalism is not itself sufficient to combat this trend.
Courts, by adopting a broader, more holistic view of public convictions — rather than resorting to raw first-order
convictions — can act to maintain plurality in law-making.
Under the core values approach, the legitimacy of courts is grounded not in strict adherence to law, but in a set of
fundamental values which are shared by society as a whole (“shared values”). It is these shared values which
ought to shape judicial decision-making.
Justice Barak appears to endorse the shared values approach. In response to a suggestion that the Court should
not hear cases whose subject matter is the topic of fierce public debate and strong public sentiments, Barak
opined that:
Our legal education, our judicial experience and our faith in the law give us composure even in the
midst of the turbulent mood which surrounds us. We are guided by principles and fundamental
values, not transient spirits of the times.7)HCJ 1635/90 Zarzevsky v. The Prime Minister, 45(1) PD
749, [28] (Barak P) (our translation).
Barak seeks to shield judicial decision-making from improper considerations, such as passing trends and public
sentiment, by engaging underlying values.8)Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (2004) 47, 149; see also
HCJ 4267/93 AMITAI—Citizens for Right Administration and Integrity v. The Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak
Rabin 47(5) PD 441, [44] (Barak J??) (published in Nevo 8 September 1993).  In Barak’s opinion, the fundamental
values shared by society are not “a consensus formed by transient trends that are inconsistent with the society’s
fundamental values. … When society is not being true to itself, judges are not required to give expression to its
passing trends.”9)Aharon Barak supra note 9 at 149. Barak guides judges to carefully draw on the public’s
underlying, higher-order convictions:
It is precisely because the judge is not elected by the people and does not present them with a
social and political platform that qualifies him express society’s profoundest perceptions without
being influenced by the needs of the moment. For this purpose, he must operate with judicial
objectivity. He must express the outlook of society even if it is not his personal outlook.10)CA
6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221, [81] (Barak
P) (YU trans.); see also HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [1993] IsrSC
47(2) 229, [52] (Barak P); Aharon Barak, Selected Writings (Part A) 942–3 (2000).
Confronting populism ultimately requires a combination of well-reasoned judgment and an ironclad will to resist
the sometimes violent force of public opinion.
A judge does not aspire to the noble and the pure … he does not conjure up an unachievable,
ideal society which does not exist in reality … At the same time, he must avoid market-ethic
pragmatism. A judge does not reflect the distorted views rampant in society … The fact that
“everyone does so” is not a criterion.11)HCJ 7074/93 Swissa v. Attorney General  [1994] IsrSC
48(2) 749, [48].
According to shared values approach a judge’s duty is to adjudicate disputes by giving effect to underlying
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principles (and not just black-letter law), even if this means acting contrary to public sentiment. In all situations,
but especially in the face of surging political populism, judges must recall and fulfill this basic mandate.
Ironically where the legislature becomes populist, courts have an obligation to compensate for this democratic
deficit and actively defend the societal shared values. This additional responsibility, however, threatens to trigger
judicial populism. In order to avoid this trap, courts (like integrative representatives in the political sphere) must
remain vigilant, shield their decisions from fleeting changes to the public mood and draw on society’s
fundamental kernel of shared values.
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